Redefining synaesthesia? by Cohen Kadosh, Roi & Terhune, Devin Blair
2012, British Journal of Psychology, 103, 20-23 
RUNNING HEAD: Redefining synaesthesia? 
 
 
 
 
 
Redefining synaesthesia? 
 
Roi Cohen Kadosh  
Devin Blair Terhune 
 
Department of Experimental Psychology 
University of Oxford 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012, British Journal of Psychology, 103, 20-23 
In a thought-provoking paper Simner (2010) highlights and criticizes a number of assumptions 
concerning synaesthesia. She specifically takes issue with the following assumptions: 1) 
synaesthesia is strictly a sensory-perceptual phenomenon; 2) consistency of inducer-concurrent 
pairs is the gold-standard for establishing the authenticity of an individual’s synaesthesia; and 3) 
synaesthesia is not heterogeneous. In the wake of this critique, Simner advances a working 
definition of synaesthesia as a neurological hyper-association that aims to be more inclusive of 
its variants. We are very sympathetic to Simner’s approach and believe that it raises important 
points that will advance our understanding of synaesthesia. Below we supplement, and 
sometimes challenge, some of these ideas. 
 
Synaesthesia as a ‘Merging of the Senses’ 
Simner (2010) rejects the argument that synaesthesia is strictly a sensory-perceptual phenomenon 
and we are in complete agreement with her. It is interesting to note that many synaesthetic 
experiences are induced by cultural tools, such as letters, numbers, time units, which neurally 
develop later, and are evolutionarily newer. In our view, this division between sensory and non-
sensory synaesthesia should guide our search for the origins of this condition. Might it be that 
synaesthetic experiences that involve sensory inducers or concurrents originate at a different 
developmental stage (e.g., infancy) than non-sensory synaesthetic experiences (e.g., early 
childhood, beginning of schooling)? Relatedly, different types of synaesthetic experience may 
result from different mechanisms such as disinhibition {Grossenbacher, 2001 #1290}, excessive 
connectivity {Bargary, 2008 #2409}, or lack of cortical specialization {Cohen Kadosh, 2009 
#2380}. 
It is more parsimonious, but probably wrong, to ascribe synaesthesia as a homogenous 
phenomenon that occurred due to single mechanism, such as excessive connectivity. In other 
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fields that examine atypical development, such as dyslexia or dyscalculia, it is clear that there are 
several subtypes with distinct neural and cognitive origins {Rubinsten, 2009 #2490}. The field of 
synaesthesia, which is relatively younger, still tries to push all the cases under one umbrella, as 
was unsuccessfully done in the past with other forms of atypical development {Butterworth, 1999 
#1198}. 
 
Consistency 
Simner (2010) next refutes the test of consistency as the “gold standard” for demonstrating the 
genuineness of an individual’s synaesthesia. She notes that widespread adoption of this criterion 
has led to the exclusion of a small subset of individuals, who otherwise report experiences 
suggestive of synaesthesia, from inclusion in various studies. It is clearly paramount to further 
investigate such individuals using functional neuroimaging. For instance, if a subset of 
grapheme-colour synaesthetes report experiencing colour when presented with graphemes, but 
display inconsistent pairings, they may still exhibit similar cortical activation patterns as 
‘consistent’ synaesthetes. If this were found to be the case, there would be no reason for 
excluding them from empirical studies. The same conclusion is valid at the behavioural level; if 
these subjects exhibit behavioural response patterns (e.g., Stroop interference effects) displayed 
by other synaesthetes, and which are relatively independent of subjective strategy (Cohen Kadosh 
& Walsh, 2009), there is little ground for assuming that they are not synaesthetes. In either case, 
such individuals clearly require greater empirical attention. Simner should be praised for 
reminding us of how the manner by which we study a phenomenon often colours our conception 
of it. It is critical to not attribute certain characteristics reported by a subset of synaesthetes to all 
of them and to be mindful of considering features that may be artifactual of our research methods 
as principal characteristics of this condition. 
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The issue of consistency raises the further question of the status of transient episodes of 
synaesthesia. Grapheme-colour synaesthesia can be experimentally induced by posthypnotic 
suggestion (Cohen Kadosh, Henik, Catena, Walsh, & Fuentes, 2009) and different forms of 
synaesthesia are often spontaneously experienced following the ingestion of lysergic acid 
diethylamide (e.g., Grossenbacher, 1997). A better understanding of the commonalities and 
differences between these types of synaesthesia and congenital synaesthesia will advance our 
understanding of the origin and locus of the synaesthetic experience. 
 
Heterogeneity 
A central contention of Simner’s (2010) paper is that certain features manifested by only a subset 
of synaesthetes have been erroneously attributed to all synaesthetes and/or interpreted as 
principal features of synaesthesia. Simner clearly demonstrates how certain features of 
synaesthesia widely regarding as fundamental (e.g., consistency) might only present in a subset 
of individuals with this condition. This represents an important reminder about the perils of 
generalizing from small samples (upon which the majority of synaesthesia research is based) and 
points to the strengths of large sample studies that are more sensitive to tapping individual 
differences in this population (e.g., Eagleman, 2010). 
 
Simner rightly acknowledges individual differences among synaesthetes and briefly describes the 
principal differences between lower and higher synaesthetes and between associator and projector 
synaesthetes as important variables that require greater attention. Although there is accumulating 
evidence for these subtypes (Dixon, Smilek, & Merikle, 2004; Hubbard, Arman, Ramachandran, 
& Boynton, 2005; Rouw & Scholte, 2010), but see {Ward, 2007 #2424}), it is imperative that 
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caution be exerted before they are interpreted as reflecting discrete subtypes as opposed to 
occupying different positions along a continuum. That is, it is necessary to consider whether the 
lower-higher and associator-projector dimensions are categorical (i.e., reflecting distinct 
subtypes) or dimensional (i.e., existing along a continuum). These are empirical questions that 
can be resolved but will require large samples of synaesthetes. Similarly, given that synaesthetes 
and non-synaesthetes exhibit some similarities in letter-colour and other associations {Rich, 2005 
#2011}{Cohen Kadosh, 2007 #2248}{Ward, 2006 #2121}{Simner, 2005 #2122}, it may be 
worthwhile to consider where non-synaesthetes fall on the aforementioned dimensions, 
specifically whether they are more proximal to one or another subtype (or position) or whether 
variability among non-synaesthetes is largely orthogonal to that observed among synaesthetes. 
 
Defining synaesthesia 
In shining light upon the various assumptions in the literature, Simner (2010) advances a working 
definition of synaesthesia as a neurological hyper-association that aims to be more inclusive of 
its variants. We believe this is a worthwhile exercise, but wonder whether she arrives at a 
definition that is overly inclusive. As an example of this over-inclusiveness, Simner concludes by 
asserting that synaesthesia “is characterized by the pairing of a particular triggering stimulus with 
a particular resultant experience” (p. 24). It is readily apparent that this description is overly 
inclusive insofar as it also encompasses a wide variety of processes that are distinct from 
synaesthesia (e.g., cross-modal interactions, a variety of forms of learning). 
 
Another, more troublesome issue in defining synaesthesia biologically, is that it is still unclear 
what will be the dependent variable. For example shall we look for changes in gray matter 
volume, white matter, or brain activity? What the direction of these changes should be (i.e., 
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increased or decreased brain activation)? Individual differences among synaesthetes also 
introduce a challenge. Moreover, different people with different type of synaesthesia, or even 
with the same type of synaesthesia might show different markers resultant from their different 
aetiologies (hyper-connectivity, disinhibition, lack of cortical specialization, changes in gamma 
band/oscillations). A further problem is that the connection between brain and behaviour is 
sometimes not as straightforward {Wilkinson, 2004 #1583}. While we are sympathetic to 
Simner’s approach, we think that we need to gain a better understanding of the cognitive, 
developmental, and neural bases of synaesthesia before defining it biologically. Notwithstanding 
this point, Simner’s ideas are likely to advance our knowledge and to make another step toward a 
possible biological definition of synaesthesia in the future. 
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